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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS ISSUES 
FOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYERS 
By, Andrew Malahowski and Jeff  Nowak 
Andrew Malahowski is compliance counsel at Gallagher Benefit Services, working in Dallas, 
Texas.  Andrew focuses on all areas of health and welfare plan compliance, including regulatory 
compliance under the Affordable Care Act, ERISA, and various employee benefits requirements under 
the Internal Revenue Code.  Prior to joining Gallagher in March, Andrew was a partner with the law 
firm of Franczek Radelet, representing both private and public sector employers in all areas of employee 
benefits law. Andrew has been a contributing editor for the Developing Labor Law, and has contributed 
articles for the Illinois Public Employee Relations Report and the Employment Law Strategist.  He 
received his B.A. from the University of Notre Dame, cum laude, in 1999, and his J.D. from the University 
of Notre Dame Law School, magna cum laude, in 2002. 
Jeff Nowak is a partner with the law firm of Franczek Radelet.  Jeff represents private and public 
sector management clients in all areas of labor and employment law.  He regularly counsels and 
litigates single- and multi-plaintiff matters relating to employment discrimination and traditional labor 
claims, and has extensive trial experience in the area of employment law.  He is considered a national 
leader in the areas of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), including counseling clients on compliance with FMLA regulations, conducting FMLA audits and 
training, and successfully litigating FMLA and ADA lawsuits.  He also is the author of FMLA Insights, 
which was named one of the top 100 legal blogs by the ABA Journal for the third consecutive year in 
2013.  Jeff received his B.A. from Indiana University in 1995, and his J.D. from Indiana University in 
1999. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court struck down part of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), a federal law which prevented the federal 
government from recognizing same-sex marriages.[1] On November 5, 2013, both 
houses of the Illinois General Assembly voted to approve same-sex marriage, and 
Governor Quinn signed the bill into law on November 20.[2] The Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Windsor and the action of the Illinois General 
Assembly have immediate and long-term administrative compliance issues for 
employers and employer-sponsored benefit plans.  This article explores some of 
the key implications for public sector employers.  Part II provides a summary of 
the legal rules which governed same-sex unions both in Illinois and elsewhere, 
prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor.  Part III provides a summary of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor.  Part IV provides a summary of the Illinois 
Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, which will permit same-sex 
marriage in Illinois.  Part V provides a summary of the guidance issued following 
the Windsor decision which is relevant for both employee relations and employee 
benefit plans in the public sector.  We expect additional agency guidance to be 
issued in the future concerning same-sex marriages (perhaps even between the 
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time this article is written and the time it is published), so legal compliance 
remains somewhat of a moving target. 
II.      DOMA (PRE-WINDSOR) AND STATE LAWS GOVERNING 
SAME-SEX UNIONS 
DOMA was enacted in 1996 with two significant sections: (1) Section 2 granted 
states the right to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other 
states; and (2) Section 3 amended the definition of “marriage” and “spouse” for all 
federal statutes, regulations, and interpretations administered by federal agencies 
and entities.[3] Specifically, DOMA defined “marriage” as “only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and defined “spouse” as 
“a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”[4] Section 3’s definitions 
affected more than 1,000 federal statutes – and their corresponding regulations – 
in which marital or spousal status is defined as a matter of federal law.[5] 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor, it was clear that neither the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),[6] nor the federal rules governing qualified 
retirement plans, health and welfare plans,[7] and payroll taxes[8] required the 
recognition of same-sex marriages.  More to the point, in many cases the 
recognition of same-sex marriage was prohibited by DOMA.  For example, the 
right to provide tax-free health and welfare benefits and the right to provide certain 
qualified retirement plan rights were limited to opposite sex spouses under federal 
law.[9] Therefore, based on the rules set forth in DOMA, it became common for 
employers to simply limit employment and employee benefits rights solely to 
opposite sex spouses.    For example, it was common for employers to limit health 
and welfare plan eligibility to the employee and the employee’s opposite sex spouse 
(and any dependent children).  When defining eligibility for benefits, employee 
benefit plans often specifically referenced DOMA or “federal law” as a rationale 
and legal justification for this limitation.  Further, FMLA leave was not provided 
to employees to care for a same-sex spouse  with a  serious health condition. 
Nevertheless, even prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor, a number of states had 
begun to recognize same-sex marriage – even though state law did not control 
on  issues of federal law.  At the time of the Court’s decision in Windsor, the 
District of Columbia and 13 states recognized same-sex marriage.[10] On the other 
hand, a number of states took opposite measures.  Twenty-nine states passed 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage.[11] Many of these states also banned 
other types of same-sex unions.[12] Finally, six states and Puerto Rico had 
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statutory bans on the recognition of same-sex marriage at the time of 
the Windsor decision.[13] 
Further, in some states that did not recognize same-sex marriage (including, at 
that time, Illinois), other “marriage-like” rights and privileges were extended by 
state legislatures.  For example, on June 1, 2011, Illinois began recognizing civil 
unions in accordance with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil 
Union Act (the “Civil Union Act”).[14] The Civil Union Act allowed both same-sex 
and opposite sex couples to enter into civil unions and provide them with the same 
legal rights, responsibilities, benefits and protections as are afforded or recognized 
under Illinois law to married spouses (e.g., the ability to make emergency medical 
decisions for partners, adoption and parental rights, spousal testimonial privilege 
and state spousal benefits, including workers’ compensation and spousal pension 
coverage).[15] A notable caveat was that the Civil Union Act did not label these civil 
unions as a “marriage.”  In fact, pursuant to the Civil Union Act, Illinois treated 
marriages lawfully performed in another state only as a civil union.[16] 
The Civil Union Act spawned sometimes confusing rules with respect to 
employment and employee benefits issues – primarily due to the tensions between 
state and federal law at the time.   For example, the Illinois Department of 
Insurance opined that the Civil Union Act had implications for sponsors of fully-
insured employee benefit plans, which are governed in part by the Illinois 
Insurance Code.  In that guidance, the Department of Insurance took the position 
that “health insurance policies and HMO contracts issued in Illinois must offer 
coverage to civil union couples and their families that is identical to the coverage 
offered to married couples and their families.”[17] Insurance carriers and third-
party administrators often reached a similar conclusion for governmental health 
plans, regardless of whether they were fully-insured or self-insured.  In contrast, 
private sector self-insured plans were not legally required to cover civil union 
partners (though, in practice, many did anyway). 
Finally, in the absence of state action (or even in the presence of state action that 
didn’t fulfill the employer’s wishes), many employers voluntarily decided to offer 
certain rights and benefits to same-sex spouses, domestic partners, and civil union 
partners – at least where it was possible to do so.  For example, many employers 
provided for the right of domestic partners of an employee to enroll in their group 
health plans.  This often created difficult payroll tax responsibilities for 
employers.  After all, while opposite sex spouses were permitted to receive tax free 
benefits under federal law, domestic partners would only be entitled to receive tax-
free benefits if they met the criteria for being “qualified dependents” under the 
Internal Revenue Code.[18] Sometimes they did, and sometimes they didn’t.  This 
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discrepancy led to complicated obligations for employers to “impute” additional 
taxable income for certain individuals but not others. 
In short, prior to Windsor, the legal landscape could not have been much more 
complicated, challenging, and uncertain for employers. 
III.    SUMMARY OF THE WINDSOR DECISION 
Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor has changed 
everything.  And hopefully, in time, the Court’s decision will simplify things from 
an administrative perspective for employers.  In Windsor, the Supreme Court held 
in a 5-4 decision that Section 3 of DOMA violated the Equal Protection clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[19] With the reversal of 
Section 3, the Court granted the same benefits and rights under federal law to 
same-sex spouses as to opposite sex spouses. 
A.   Facts of the Windsor Case 
Long-time New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer registered with the 
state as domestic partners in 1993. In 2007, facing Spyer’s ailing health, the couple 
married in Ontario, Canada.  They returned and continued to reside in New York, 
which recognized their marriage at the time Spyer died in 2009. 
Spyer left her entire estate to Windsor.  The Internal Revenue Service, however, 
deemed Windsor ineligible for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax 
because of the prohibitions contained in DOMA.  As a result, Windsor owed 
$363,053 in estate taxes. She paid the tax and requested a refund. The IRS denied 
the refund since Windsor did not qualify as a “surviving spouse.”[20] 
Windsor sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York claiming Section 3 of DOMA violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal 
protection. The District Court held Section 3 unconstitutional and ordered the IRS 
to refund the tax with interest.[21] The Second Circuit affirmed. The United States 
did not comply with the judgment, and the case was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court.[22] 
B.    The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Court  traced the history of domestic relations as an area of law left virtually 
exclusively to the states.[23] In this context, the Court found that New York’s 
decision to recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state – and 
ultimately, its decision to permit same-sex marriages to be performed in New York 
WINTER 2014 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  7 
 
 
 
– was a valid exercise of state sovereign power to define and regulate marriage. 
The Court characterized New York’s enactments as a determination by New York’s 
citizens and elected officials to right an earlier injustice and acknowledge “the 
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the state 
worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.”[24] 
The Court acknowledged that, in some circumstances, Congress had enacted 
statutes bearing on marital rights and privileges.  However, the Court contrasted 
Section 3 with these statutes, noting that DOMA had a “far greater reach” and was 
“directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, 
have sought to protect.”[25] In this regard, the Court found, DOMA diverged from 
the history and tradition of relying on state law to define marriage.[26] 
Turning to  DOMA’s legislative history, the Court found that the “essence” of 
DOMA was to interfere with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages.[27] Indeed, 
the House of Representatives Report for DOMA expressly stated that “it is both 
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution 
of traditional heterosexual marriage.”[28] Congress’s goal was to “put a thumb on 
the scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws” 
for the purpose of imposing inequality, not for other reasons like governmental 
efficiency.[29] The Court found that the “bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group.”[30] 
Finally, the Court noted that DOMA had real-life consequences for certain married 
couples.  The Court noted, for example, that same-sex spouses were prevented 
from obtaining government healthcare benefits they would otherwise receive; were 
deprived of special bankruptcy protections for domestic-support obligations; and 
could not be buried together in veterans’ cemeteries.[31] Similarly, DOMA 
imposed financial burdens on the children of same-sex couples.[32] 
Based upon this analysis, the Court invalidated Section 3 of DOMA, and held: 
[N]o legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those 
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By 
seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less 
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.[33] 
The Court emphasized, however, that its ruling applied only in states that recognize 
same-sex marriages.[34] Therefore, the reach of the Windsor decision in all states 
– some of which recognize same-sex marriage, and others which do not – remained 
somewhat unclear at the time that it was decided. 
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IV.   SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN ILLINOIS 
The State of Illinois has followed the Windsor decision with action of its own.  On 
November 5, 2013, Senate Bill 10 (the Illinois same-sex marriage bill) passed out 
of the General Assembly and was sent to Governor Pat Quinn for his signature.  The 
Governor signed SB10 into law on November 20, 2013, and SB10 became Public 
Act 98-597 (called the Illinois Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act).  The 
law’s provisions will go into effect on June 1, 2014, and same-sex couples will be 
able to file applications for marriage licenses.  Below is a summary of the key 
provisions of the Act, including a discussion of some of the law’s ambiguities: 
Same-sex marriage provisions: The Act states that, “All [state] 
laws…applicable to marriage . . . shall apply equally to marriages of same-sex and 
different-sex couples and their children.”[35] The bill removes any distinction 
between same-sex and opposite sex marriages for the purpose of any benefits 
conferred by state law.  In addition, the bill provides that marriage-related terms 
such as “spouse,” “family,” “immediate family,” “dependent,” and others apply 
equally to same-sex and opposite sex spouses. [36] 
Interaction with federal law: The Act also provides that when Illinois 
marriage law relies on or refers to federal law, same-sex couples and their children 
will be treated as if federal law recognizes the marriages of same-sex couples in the 
same manner as the law of the State of Illinois.[37] The bill was first proposed in 
the Senate prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor.  After 
the Windsor decision, however, the effect of this section remains unclear. 
Effect on civil unions: Civil unions performed in the state pursuant to the 
earlier Civil Union Act will continue to be recognized after the Act has taken 
effect.  The Act also provides couples currently in a civil union with the opportunity 
to “convert” their legal relationship into a marriage, and waives the marriage 
license fee for these couples for a period of one year after the Act takes 
effect.[38] In other words, until June 1, 2015, couples currently in a civil union may 
apply to have their civil union converted into a marriage without paying a fee or 
performing a new ceremony.  The converted marriage will become effective 
retroactively as of the date the civil union was first performed.  After June 1, 2015, 
couples wishing to convert their civil union into a marriage will have to pay a new 
fee, perform a new ceremony, and their marriage date will not be retroactive to the 
date of their civil union. 
WINTER 2014 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  9 
 
 
 
V.   EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFIT LAW IMPLICATIONS 
The law has changed significantly in a short period of time, many interpretation 
issues remain, and concise regulatory guidance is hoped for but not yet 
promulgated on many fronts.  Nevertheless, legal compliance obligations surge 
forward anyway.  Even for employers who have only one employee who has a same-
sex spouse – or even if the employer has none today, but might in the future – there 
are a number of administrative compliance issues to be aware of.  The agency 
guidance to date has attempted to simplify compliance to some extent, but some 
compliance steps remain educated guesswork.  The Court’s decision 
in Windsor essentially holds that “a spouse is a spouse,” and the agency guidance 
so far largely follows that rough generalization.  Nevertheless, understanding all of 
the legal ramifications of that conclusion can be difficult. 
A.  Federal Agency Guidance Issued To Date 
As of the date this article  was written, only basic foundational agency guidance has 
been released to help interpret the Windsor decision.  On August 29, 2013, the 
Internal Revenue Service released Revenue Ruling 2013-17 to provide general 
guidance on whether, for federal tax purposes, the IRS would recognize a marriage 
of same-sex individuals even if the individuals no longer resided in a state that 
recognizes same sex marriage.[39] On September 18, 2013, the Department of 
Labor published Technical Release 2013-14, which deals with the same question 
for ERISA purposes.[40] Subsequently, IRS Notice 2013-61 provided further 
guidance on how employees and employers might seek refunds of taxes paid on the 
value of same-sex spousal benefits.[41] Finally, the IRS issued Notice 2014-1 to 
provide rules for same sex spouses who participate in employer cafeteria plans 
(including the payment of pre-tax premiums and contributions to health and 
dependent care flexible spending accounts) and health savings accounts.[42] 
While a number of questions remain, the primary interpretive question 
following Windsor has been answered by this agency guidance – namely, whether 
the “state of residence” (i.e., the state where the married couple resides) or the 
“state of celebration” (i.e., the state where the marriage was performed) 
determines whether a same sex marriage is recognized under federal tax and 
benefits law.  The agencies have chosen the latter approach, which simplifies 
compliance greatly.  The DOL and IRS guidance holds that “marriage” includes 
same-sex marriages performed in any domestic or foreign jurisdiction, even if the 
couple does not currently reside in a state that recognizes same-sex 
marriages.[43] Further, in a press release accompanying the release of the DOL’s 
ERISA guidance, Labor Secretary Thomas Perez commented, “[The Windsor] 
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decision represents a historic step toward equality for all American families, and I 
have directed the department’s agency heads to ensure that they are implementing 
the decision in a way that provides maximum protection for workers and their 
families.”[44] Therefore, further agency guidance on other legal issues 
surrounding DOMA is likely to take a similar approach. 
B.  Employee Benefit Plan Issues 
Unlike private sector employee benefit plans, public sector plans are not governed 
by ERISA.[45] However, public sector plans (both health plans and retirement 
plans) are governed by tax rules under the Internal Revenue Code which permit 
employers to offer certain benefits on a tax-free or tax-deferred basis.  Similarly, 
group health plans have sometimes complicated payroll taxation consequences for 
employee participants, which are now simpler following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Windsor and the subsequent agency guidance.  The following sections 
summarize the essential compliance steps for employers facing these changes in 
the law. 
  Amend Plan Documents If Necessary 
Health and welfare plan documents that offer spousal coverage typically include a 
definition of “spouse” for eligibility purposes.  As noted above, it was somewhat 
common before the Windsor decision for employers to define spouse to exclude 
same-sex partners, or to define spouse strictly according to federal law.  Now that 
a key part of  DOMA has been held unconstitutional, and federal regulatory law 
has been clarified by the IRS and DOL, old plan definitions may no longer match 
the employer’s intent.  Or, if the plan’s definition of spouse explicitly references 
DOMA, it will not make any practical sense at all.  Therefore, plan documents 
should be amended so that the plan’s written definition of spouse matches how the 
plan will be administered. 
Further, while self-insured private sector employers may continue to have freedom 
to exclude same-sex spouses from health plan coverage, fully-insured plans and 
public sector employers in Illinois likely will not have the same freedom.  In light 
of the Windsor decision, as well as the statutory recognition of same-sex marriage 
in Illinois, we expect both fully-insured plans and all governmental plans in Illinois 
to be required to offer the same rights to same-sex spouses as they do to opposite 
sex spouses.  Further guidance would be welcome as to what is mandated and what 
is permissive. 
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  Determine Employee Marital Status 
Employers who offer health plan coverage to spouses will now need to determine 
which employees have a legal marriage to a same-sex spouse.  This includes 
employers who currently offer coverage only to domestic partners rather than 
same-sex spouses.  It is likely that some employees who have been receiving 
coverage for their same sex domestic partner also have a formal marriage to that 
partner.  On the other hand, some employees will currently meet only the 
traditional criteria for domestic partner coverage (joint residence and joint bank 
accounts, etc.), but will not have a legally performed marriage to that partner.  The 
only way the employer can know the answer to this question is to ask, and the 
employer has every right to ask so that it can apply the eligibility terms of its health 
plan accurately. 
  Taxation of Benefits Provided to Employees With Same-Sex Spouses 
Same-sex spouses are now treated the same as opposite sex spouses have 
historically been treated with respect to the taxation of group health plan 
benefits.  In general, employees are not taxed on the value of group health benefits 
provided to their spouse.  Further, employer flexible spending account (“FSA”) 
plans may reimburse qualified medical expenses for both the employee and the 
employee’s spouse (including any qualified dependents).  Finally, employees may 
pay for the cost of premiums for group health coverage for themselves and their 
spouse (and qualified dependents) on a pre-tax basis pursuant to the employer’s 
cafeteria plan under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code.  These same 
benefits are now available to same-sex spouses after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Windsor and the subsequent guidance issued by the IRS. 
  Continuing Tax Implications For Non-Spouse Domestic Partners 
Even in the wake of Windsor and the Illinois Religious Freedom and Marriage 
Fairness Act, some employers may still offer certain benefits to same-sex domestic 
partners of their employees. Employers who continue to offer health coverage to 
non-spousal domestic partners will continue to have more complicated tax 
obligations.  The IRS was careful to note that, for federal tax purposes, a spouse 
does “not include individuals (whether opposite sex or the same sex) who have 
entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil union, or other similar formal 
relationship recognized under state law that is not denominated as a marriage 
under the laws of that state.”[46] 
The Internal Revenue Code permits employers to provide tax-free health benefits 
only to employees, their spouses (now including same-sex spouses), children 
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under the age of 27, and qualified dependents under Section 105(b) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Individuals who do not fall within one of these categories are not 
entitled to receive tax free health benefits.  In the case of domestic partners, some 
individuals may meet the criteria for being a qualified dependent and others may 
not.  While a full explanation of these taxation rules is not provided here, generally 
a qualified dependent is an individual who: (i) has the same principal place of 
residence as the employee and is a member of the employee’s household for the 
calendar year; (ii) is provided over one-half of his or her financial support for the 
calendar year by the employee.[47] For example, domestic partners who rely on 
the employee for financial support and reside with the employee are likely to meet 
the criteria for being a qualified dependent; working domestic partners who 
provide their own support or who do not meet the criteria would not. 
If an employee’s non-marital domestic partner participates in the employer’s 
health plan but does not meet the criteria for being a qualified dependent, 
additional taxable income must be imputed to the employee.  Providing benefits to 
a nonqualified dependent is a taxable event.  The amount of imputed income must 
be the “fair market value” of the nonqualifying coverage, though the exact amount 
to impute is not set in stone.  In one private letter ruling request to the IRS, COBRA 
rates were used as the fair market value of non-dependent domestic partner 
coverage. [48] Other informal rulings have followed a similar path. However, the 
IRS declined to expressly rule on the appropriateness of this valuation method, 
citing its policy of not ruling on fact issues such as the determination of fair market 
value.  More recently, the IRS noted informally at an ABA Joint Committee on 
Employee Benefits meeting that it “declines expressing an opinion on how fair 
market value is determined.”[49] Many employers use COBRA rates (minus the 
2% administrative charge) as the fair market value of coverage for purposes of 
imputed income, but other approaches are permissible. 
Due to the complications provided by these rules, we expect that most employers 
will decide to remove domestic partner coverage from their employee benefit plans 
in favor of simply providing coverage to spouses (including same-sex 
spouses).  After all, the original rationale for providing domestic partner coverage 
no longer exists because same-sex couples will have opportunities, even in Illinois, 
to get a legal marriage and secure tax free benefits.  Nevertheless, a smooth 
transition is recommended.  It would cause a significant amount of upheaval for 
employees if domestic partner coverage was removed with no advance lead time, 
such as time to actually get a legal marriage so that benefit eligibility can be 
preserved.  Therefore, employers who remove domestic partner benefits in favor 
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of same-sex spousal benefits should consider providing advance notice to their 
employees and a delayed effective date for such action. 
  COBRA Continuation Rights 
The rules governing COBRA continuation coverage are memorialized in both the 
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.  However, the Code’s COBRA provisions are 
inapplicable to governmental plans[50], and ERISA’s COBRA provisions are also 
inapplicable to governmental plans.[51] Nevertheless, COBRA continuation 
obligations still extend to governmental employers pursuant to the Public Health 
Service Act (“PHSA”).[52] While formal guidance would be welcome, it is expected 
that COBRA continuation rights for same-sex spouses will also apply to 
governmental employers under the PHSA.  Therefore, if a public employer 
provides group health coverage to same-sex spouses and that spouse experiences 
a qualifying event under COBRA (for example, divorce from the employee or the 
employee’s termination of employment), a notice of continuation rights should be 
provided and continuation of health benefits should be permitted for the same-sex 
spouse pursuant to the PHSA. 
  Retirement Plans 
All of the obligations for qualified retirement plans following Windsor are not yet 
clear, but some guidance has begun to emerge.  In a Q&A released following 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the IRS announced that “[a] qualified retirement plan 
must treat a same-sex spouse as a spouse for purposes of satisfying the federal tax 
laws relating to qualified retirement plans.”[53] The IRS also stated that it intends 
to issue further guidance on how qualified retirement plans and other tax-favored 
retirement arrangements must comply with Windsor, including guidance on plan 
amendment requirements and any necessary corrections relating to plan 
operations for periods before this guidance is issued.  As of the date that this article 
was written, we are still awaiting this additional guidance. 
Pending additional guidance, we expect that the following rules will apply at a 
minimum to qualified retirement plans in the public sector: (1) statutory public 
sector plans which are governed by the Illinois Pension Code will likely be required 
to offer their existing spousal benefits, such as survivor annuities and death 
benefits, to same-sex spouses; (2) non-statutory public sector plans may not be 
subject to the same mandate, though many employers will choose to equalize 
benefits for both same-sex and opposite sex spouses and broad plan definitions of 
“spouse” may lead to that conclusion as well; (3) plans must allow same-sex 
widows of employees to make direct rollovers of the employee’s accrued and vested 
benefit to their own IRA or eligible retirement plan in the same way that opposite 
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sex spouses can; (4) required minimum distributions under Section 401(a)(9) of 
the Internal Revenue Code must take into account the life expectancy of the 
participant and his or her spouse (whether that spouse is same-sex or opposite 
sex); (5) benefits may be transferred to a divorced same-sex spouse pursuant to a 
valid Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Order.  Other rules affecting qualified 
retirement plans in the private sector (which are governed by ERISA and 
additional rules under the Internal Revenue Code which are unique to ERISA-
covered plans) may not apply to public sector plans.  Concise agency guidance, 
differentiating between ERISA plans and governmental plans, would be welcome. 
C.  Employment Law Issues 
The primary impact that Windsor will have on federal employment law concerns 
the FMLA.  The FMLA allows an eligible employee to take leave in order to care for 
a spouse with a serious health condition; because of any qualifying exigency arising 
out of the fact that the spouse is on covered active duty (or has been notified of an 
impending call or order to covered active duty) in the Armed Forces; or to care for 
a spouse who is a covered service member.[54] 
The FMLA defines “spouse” as “a husband or wife, as the case may be.”[55] The 
corresponding DOL regulations define “spouse” as “a husband or wife as defined 
or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the 
employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is 
recognized.”[56] While this regulation suggests that the DOL would look to state 
law to define “spouse,” the DOL acknowledged in a 1998 Opinion Letter that it was 
bound by DOMA’s definition of “spouse,” concluding, “Because FMLA is a Federal 
law, it is our interpretation that only the Federal definition of marriage and spouse 
as established under DOMA may be recognized for FMLA leave 
purposes.”[57] Until Windsor, then, married same-sex couples who resided in 
states that recognized their marriages were ineligible to take FMLA leave to care 
for a spouse as permitted by the FMLA.  In light of guidance provided by the DOL 
for employee benefit plans, and Secretary Perez’s comments, it is reasonable to 
expect that the DOL will adopt a “state of celebration” rule for purposes of the 
FMLA similar to that adopted for ERISA and the tax code. 
In striking down Section 3 of DOMA, the Supreme Court cleared the way for each 
state to decide its own definition of “spouse.”  Windsor makes clear that if an 
employee is married to a same-sex partner and lives in a state that recognizes 
same-sex marriage, the employee will be entitled to take FMLA leave for a spouse 
as permitted by the FMLA.  What Windsor left unclear, however, is how the FMLA 
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will be applied to employees who reside in states that do not recognize same-sex 
marriage. 
As an initial matter, the relevant FMLA regulation references the state in which the 
employee resides to determine whether a person is a spouse for purposes of the 
FMLA.  Therefore, even if the employee formerly lived or was married in a state 
that recognized the same-sex marriage, the employee is unlikely to be considered 
a spouse in the “new” state for purposes of the FMLA unless the new state 
recognizes the marriage (as New York did at the time of Spyer’s death). 
To date the DOL has issued only limited guidance on how Windsor will impact the 
definition of “spouse” in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage.  In August 
2013, the DOL updated its FMLA Fact Sheets to reflect that the definition of 
“spouse” under the FMLA also includes those individuals who have entered into a 
same-sex marriage. Specifically, the Fact Sheets define “spouse” as “a husband or 
wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in the state 
where the employee resides, including ‘common law’ marriage and same-sex 
marriage.”[58] The DOL also indicated that the 1998 Opinion Letter discussing the 
application of DOMA to the FMLA is “under review” in light of Windsor.[59] 
As noted above, Governor Quinn has now signed SB10 and Illinois will become the 
sixteenth state to allow same-sex marriage, starting on June 1, 2014.[60] For 
purposes of the FMLA, therefore, same-sex married couples in Illinois, including 
those residing in Illinois who were lawfully married in another jurisdiction, will be 
entitled to the spousal leave benefits guaranteed by the FMLA when the Act 
becomes effective. 
While the most widespread impact of Windsor with respect to employment law 
will be with the FMLA, other employment statutes are also affected.  For 
example, Windsor broadens the reach of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA).[61] GINA prohibits discrimination based 
on genetic information by employers and other covered entities having 15 or more 
employees.[62] Specifically, the statute forbids an employer or other covered 
entity from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information of an 
employee or a family member of the employee.[63] GINA defines “family member” 
as a “dependent,” and references ERISA’s definition of that term.[64] The 
referenced provision of ERISA deals with special enrollment periods for health 
insurance coverage, including when an individual becomes a dependent through 
marriage.[65] Since GINA expressly incorporates a definition of “family member” 
from federal law that uses the terms “marriage” and “spouse,” the definition will 
be broadened to include same-sex spouses in states that recognize such marriages 
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as a result of Windsor.  Consequently, it is now a violation of GINA to request, 
require, or purchase genetic information with respect to same-sex spouse of an 
employee in states where same-sex marriage is allowed. 
In addition, Windsor will result in same-sex spouses being excluded from coverage 
under certain federal laws.[66] For example, the National Labor Relations Act 
excludes from its definition of employee “any individual employed by his . . . 
spouse.”[67] As a result, these individuals are no longer entitled to organize or to 
engage in collective bargaining.  Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts 
from coverage “any establishment that has as its only regular employees the owner 
thereof or the . . . spouse . . . of such owner.”[68] 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
We expect 2014 to be a busy year for federal agencies and employee benefits 
specialists alike, as additional regulatory guidance is issued.  In particular, 
additional federal guidance is expected on the retroactivity of 
the Windsor decision, and it is always possible that additional state legislative or 
court action will modify the legal landscape governing same-sex marriage even 
further.  There will certainly be growing pains along the way, but the hope is always 
that compliance becomes second-nature in due time. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By, Student Editorial Board: 
Marco Berrios, Peter Brierton, Alec Hausermann, and Stephanie 
Ridella 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 
I.  IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Arbitrability 
In Harlem Federation of Teachers, Local 540, IFT-AFT, AFL-CIO, and Harlem 
School District No. 122, 30 PERI ¶ 153 (IELRB 2013), the Union filed a grievance, 
claiming that several reductions in force, position eliminations and other district 
reorganizations violated the collective bargaining agreement, and that the School 
District should be compelled to arbitrate.  The School District contended that the 
collective bargaining agreements provided that the arbitrator did not have the 
authority to decide any question within the responsibility of the Board of 
Education to decide, and that the decisions made were within the inherent 
managerial authority of the Board. 
The IELRB concluded that the issues were arbitrable.  The IELRB reasoned that a 
management rights clause does not mean a grievance is inarbitrable, as the 
meaning of that clause within the agreement is a matter of interpretation for the 
arbitrator to determine.  The collective bargaining agreements themselves 
contained a number of provisions that touched upon the decisions made in 
reorganizing the district.  The arbitration provisions in the collective bargaining 
agreements were susceptible to an interpretation that covers the parties’ 
disputes.  The function of the IELRB was not to weigh the merits of the grievance 
and the merits must not be considered in deciding whether grievances are 
arbitrable; even frivolous claims can be susceptible to interpretation favoring 
arbitration. 
The School District argued the grievance over reductions in force and 
reorganization were inarbitrable because Section 10-23.5 of the School Code 
provided that a school district has the power to “employ such educational support 
personnel employees as it deems advisable and to define their employment duties,” 
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and provides procedures to reduce the number of employees and eliminate 
programs.  However, the IELRB said the statute does not render the grievances 
inarbitrable because, while it “grants school districts the power to define the 
employment duties of educational support employees, it does not provide that 
these decisions are within the sole discretion of the school district.”  Other aspects 
of the employment relationship are not covered under the statute, such 
as employee work year or hours, but are subject to collective bargaining, and thus 
the issues are arbitrable. 
B.  Duty to Provide Information 
In Board of Education of City of Chicago v. IELRB, 2013 Ill. App. (1st) 122447, the 
First District Appellate Court reversed the IELRB and held that the School Board 
was not obligated under the IELRA to release student records to the union for use 
in a grievance proceeding.  A school security officer was terminated after being 
accused of starting altercations with two students.  During the grievance 
proceedings, the union argued that the first alleged altercation did not happen and 
that the second was started by the student, who had violent tendencies and was 
later expelled because of a fight with school staff. 
The dispute went to arbitration and the School Board denied the Union’s request 
for the students’ redacted disciplinary records.  The School Board refused to 
comply with the arbitrator’s subpoena, although it indicated it would comply with 
a court order.  Rather than file in court, the Union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge, and proceeded with the arbitration.  In arbitration, the employee was 
reinstated. 
The unfair labor practice charge alleged that the School Board’s refusal to provide 
the student records violated its duty under the IELRA to bargain in good faith with 
employee representatives.  The School Board responded that under the Illinois 
Student Records Act it could only turn over those records pursuant to a court 
order.  The IELRB found that the request for redacted records mitigated 
confidentiality concerns for the students, and found that the School Board 
committed an unfair labor practice. 
On appeal, the court reversed.  The court observed that the duty to provide 
information upon request, while a part of the obligation to bargain in good faith, is 
not absolute; the information must be “relevant to the proceedings and reasonably 
necessary to the union’s performance of its responsibilities.”  Furthermore, 
employers may assert an affirmative defense to production, such as confidentiality 
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or employee privacy.  As a matter of first impression in published Illinois decisions, 
the court examined the merits of a statutory defense to production. 
Examining the Student Records Act, the court first held that redacted student 
records, despite the removal of individual information, were still protected student 
records because they are still sought to gain information about two individual 
students.  Although the students would be identified by initials rather than names, 
the union would know who they were. The court distinguished cases involving 
overall statistical information in which individual students could not be identified. 
Section 6 of the Student Records Act requires a court order before student records 
may be disclosed, and the rights of parents and students do not yield to the duty to 
bargain in good faith.  The court saw “no basis upon which to conclude that the 
union’s need for student records, under any and all circumstances, takes 
precedence over the right of parents to notice and the opportunity to challenge the 
release of their child’s records.” 
C.  Employee Reclassifications 
In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399 v. IELRB, 2013 IL App 
(1st) 122432-U), the First District Appellate Court upheld the IELRB’s dismissal of 
the union’s claim alleging that Western Illinois University had violated sections 
14(1) and 14(5) of the IELRA by failing to apply the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) to employees who had received a new job 
classification removing them from the bargaining unit and who were returned to 
the bargaining unit at a later date. 
“Maintenance workers” were added to the job classification portion of the 
collective bargaining agreement in April 1991. This term continued to be part of 
the agreement when a new CBA was negotiated in July 2010 that was effective 
August 1, 2009 until July 31, 2014. Maintenance workers were tasked with 
removing asbestos and installing heat and frost insulation. By January 2010, 
however, a large portion of the work was installation of heat/frost insulation. As a 
result, six employees were reclassified as “building heat/frost insulators,” and were 
treated by the university as unrepresented prevailing rate employees.  They 
received a $3 increase in hourly pay, a 15 minute paid morning break, increased 
shift differential (from $.70 to $1), and lost their 30 minute paid lunch (cutting 
their weekly hours from 40 to 37.5). On November 8, 2010, the union petitioned 
the IELRB to add heating and frost insulators to the bargaining unit; the IELRB 
granted the petition. In February 2011 the union asked the university to apply the 
current CBA terms, including the paid lunch, to the heating and frost insulators. 
The university refused saying it was only obligated to maintain the status quo for 
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the newly classified employees until terms of employment could be negotiated. The 
university offered to bargain with the union but no negotiations occurred. The 
union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Western Illinois University 
had violated sections 14(1) and 14(5) of the IELRA by failing to apply the terms of 
the CBA to employees who had requested a new job classification removing them 
from the bargaining unit and who were added back to the bargaining unit at a later 
date. 
The court held that although the employees’ job duties remained relatively the 
same, their job classification did not. The court cited to Federal Mogul Corp., 209 
N.L.R.B. 343 (1974) in holding that just as it was unfair to apply the current CBA 
to newly added employees, it would also be unfair to require the university to apply 
the current CBA to newly classified employees who had previously not been 
represented by the union without additional bargaining. The court held that until 
the parties engage in collective bargaining the university is not permitted to apply 
the terms of the existing CBA to the heat and frost insulators and is required to 
maintain the status quo. 
II.  IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Peace Officers and Security Personnel 
In Board of Education of Peoria School. District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of 
Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent and Protective Ass’n Unit, 2013 
IL 114853, 998 N.E.2d 36, the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional Public 
Act 96-1257 which had removed peace officers employed by a school district on the 
effective date of the act from coverage under the IELRA and placed them under the 
IPLRA.  One effect of this act was to deny such employees the right to strike and to 
grant them the right to interest arbitration.  As of the effective date of the act, 
Peoria School District 150 was the only school district in the state to employ its 
own peace officers in its own police department. 
The court held that the act contravened the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition of 
special legislation.  The court interpreted the act to apply only to those school 
districts employing peace officers in their own police departments on the act’s 
effective date and not to apply to school districts that might establish police 
departments and employ peace officers in the future.  Examining the act’s purpose 
to ensure that police officers are not allowed to strike no matter who employs them, 
the court found the act’s distinction between the one school district who employed 
peace officers on the effective date of the act and school districts who might employ 
peace officers in the future lacked any rational justification. 
WINTER 2014 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  27 
 
 
 
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police, River Valley Detention Center, Chapter 228 v. 
ILRB, 2013 IL App (3d) 120308, 1N.E.3d 593, the Third District Appellate Court, 
affirmed the ILRB State Panel’s holding that  the River Valley Juvenile Detention 
Center (“RJDC”) was not a correctional facility and its supervisors were therefore 
not security personnel entitled to interest arbitration. The union which 
represented shift and nonline supervisors engaged RJDC in negotiations for a new 
collective bargaining agreement. Mediation failed to produce any results and the 
union demanded interest arbitration which the employer refused. The union filed 
an unfair labor practice charge. 
Evidence during the hearing showed that the RJDC is not governed by the Illinois 
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”); the residents are not in IDOC custody; the 
RJDC  used IDOC procedures though; the RJDC contained males and females aged 
10 to 16; residents could be admitted through a court order or through either an 
arresting officer’s or department’s recommendation and a subsequent evaluation 
by RJDC staff in order to determine if admittance is proper, which in turn would 
lead to a detention hearing where a court would determine if there was probable 
cause for delinquency; the vast majority of the residents were awaiting the 
disposition of their cases; shift supervisors were responsible for maintaining the 
secured parts of the RJDC and supervising the juvenile detention officers; the 
nonline supervisors included employees such as the court liaison and the program 
manager; both types of managers were required to meet the standards set forth by 
the Supreme Court and the Probation and Probation Officers Act; and the juvenile 
detention officers monitored the health of the residents, oversaw daily activities, 
and attended to the emotional needs of the juveniles. 
The RJDC is under the oversight of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts 
(“AOIC”). The AOIC’s mission is to “improve and enhance the probation court 
services field.” The RJDC submits its annual plan and budget to the AOIC, and the 
AOIC in part provides the RJDC’s funding. The IDOC does not provide any funding 
for the center. 
The court looked to the following Illinois laws: the IPLRA defines a security 
employee as “an employee who is responsible for the supervision and control of 
inmates at correctional facilities;” the Unified Code of Corrections defines 
“correctional facility” as “any building or part of a building where committed 
persons are kept in a secured manner;” commitment is “a judicially determined 
placement in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the basis of 
delinquency or conviction;” detention is defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 
as the temporary care of a minor who is allegedly delinquent and who requires 
temporary dentation pending disposition by a court; and the Probation Act defines 
28 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT WINTER 2014 
 
 
 
 
a probation officer as a person employed in probation or court services under the 
Probation Act or Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and meets the standards set by the 
Supreme Court. An employee who is a probation officer is also considered a judicial 
employee. 
In affirming the ILRB’s decision the court pointed out that the nature of the 
confinement was a critical distinction between RJDC and a corrections facility. The 
residents of the RJDC were awaiting adjudication and had not yet been sentenced. 
The residents of the RJDC were under a detention order rather than an order of 
commitment. The court was also persuaded by the legislative action that created 
the Department of Juvenile Justice, which is separate from the IDOC. 
Furthermore, the court pointed to the distinction created by the Prohibition Act 
that identifies detention staff, but not correctional staff, as probation officers. 
Finally, the court pointed out that the RJDC receives its funding and standards 
from the AOIC and the employees are hired under circuit’s probation and court 
services department. In closing the court stated, “Had the legislature intended the 
staff at juvenile detention homes to be considered correctional officers and the 
detention homes to be correctional facilities, it would have done so. Instead, the 
legislature expressly differentiated between detention homes and correctional 
facilities.” 
  
